Fraught with corruption and global protests, the Belo Monte project has a long and complicated history. This timeline outlines key moments and developments from the beginning.
Plans to dam the Xingu River are first proposed in the 1970s during the period of the military dictatorship in Brazil. The plans for what is originally called the Kararão Dam Complex consist of six dams throughout the Xingu basin (five dams on the Xingu River and one on the Iriri River). The reservoirs of these dams would directly flood indigenous territories and thousands of kilometers of protected forest.
The initial survey is undertaken for one of the proposed six dams, the Babaquara Dam, later renamed the Altamira Dam.
The Brazilian electric company Eletrobras produces a massive plan in 1987, known as the “2010 Plan,” providing information on dams expected to be built throughout Brazil by the year 2010 as well as listing other plans for dams without a projected date of completion. The 2010 Plan first leaks to the public and is later officially released in December 1987. The official plan lists 297 dams to be built throughout the entirety of the country, 79 of which are planned for Amazonia. According to the plan, the Kararão (later renamed Belo Monte) Dam is scheduled for completion by 2000 with the Babaquara (later renamed Altamira) Dam scheduled for construction by 2005.
Initial proposals to dam the Xingu River give rise to strong opposition from indigenous peoples, environmentalists, and other social movements, culminating in the first “Encounter of Indigenous Peoples in Altamira” in February of 1989. Following the five-day televised meeting between indigenous tribal leaders and officials of Eletronorte (an Eletrobras subsidiary), the World Bank confirms its withdrawal of the half-billion dollar loan meant for funding the construction of the Xingu dams, effectively burying the Kararaô Dam project for a time. Subsequently, Eletronorte announces the removal of dams upstream of Belo Monte from the 2010 plan and that it will undertake a “resurvey of the fall” on the Xingu River, presented in such a way to imply that upstream dams (including Altamira/Babaquara) would not be built. However, this “resurvey” only refers to the remeasurement of topography along the river, perhaps affecting the location, height and engineering specifics of each dam, but in no way signifies that Eletronorte is abandoning its dam construction plans or that the same areas of forest and indigenous land would not be flooded. Eletronorte does agree to change the name of the Kararaô to Belo Monte, as “Kararaô” is a Kaiapó word of spiritual significance, which the tribe did not wish appropriated.
The Babaquara Dam suddenly reappears as a new dam with a new name, the Altamira Dam scheduled for completion in 2013, when it is listed in in a table of key future dams in the Eletrobras 1999–2008 decennial plan. Since then, the 6588 megawatt (MW) Altamira/Babaquara Dam has quietly crept into official presentations of plans. The 2005 federal budget of Brazil included funds for an improved viability study of the Altamira/Babaquara Dam, confirming the dam’s priority in current plans for hydroelectric development on the Xingu River. The remaining four dams, namely the Ipixuna (1900 MW), Kakraimoro (1490 MW), Iriri (770 MW), and Jarina (620 MW) dams are largely absent from public discussion, although the continued activity of Eletronorte engineers in the locations in question indicates that this lack of visibility does not mean that the plans have been abandoned. Most importantly, neither Eletrobras nor any other government authorities involved have promised to give up building these dams—only to postpone these projects until a later decision can be made.
After relevant geographic and technical modifications are made, the project is re–baptized once again, this time as the Belo Monte Hydroelectric Complex, referring to the engineering works for the first dam on the "Big Bend" of the lower Xingu River. Eletronorte argues that Belo Monte project will be feasible even as an "isolated" dam on the Xingu.
At the end of 2000, Eletronorte signs a contract with FADESP, a foundation linked to the Federal University of Pará state, through which research teams are formed to carry out an environmental impact assessment (EIA). The conditions of this contract procedure, carried out without competitive bidding, and the attempt to obtain an environmental license for Belo Monte at the state level, rather than at the federal level, lead the Federal Public Ministry (Attorney General’s office) to file suit. Also in question were both Eletronorte’s failure to consult with indigenous populations who would be affected by the project as well as the lack of special congressional authorization of such studies in projects affecting indigenous peoples, both effectively contravening constitutional requirements (as per article 231). Eletronorte continues to try to dodge these requirements after redesigning the project.
Legal decisions in 2001 and 2002 stemming from the lawsuit by the Public Ministry result in the suspension of the EIA and the licensing process.
At various times throughout the 2001–2004 period, the presidents of Eletronorte refer to plans for the construction of a second dam, the Altamira, just upstream of Belo Monte. The Brazilian Ministry of Mines and Energy, in its public presentations on plans for expansion of the electric energy sector in the Amazon region, makes reference to Altamira along with Belo Monte.
Eletrobras and the Brazilian government, along with Brazilian oil and gas conglomerate Odebrecht, create a new design for the Belo Monte Dam. This new design calls for the construction of three dams (Belo Monte, Pimental, and Bela Vista), a series of large dikes, as well as two large canals to divert 80% of the Xingu river into an artificial reservoir. While no indigenous territory would be flooded, the Xingu River would be severely dewatered in a 100 square kilometer area home to three indigenous territories, potentially damaging indigenous tribal livelihoods.
In March of 2004, Brazilian President Lula da Silva calls his ministers together to demand that they find ways of circumventing environmental regulations and other impediments to completing stalled infrastructure projects throughout the country, including 18 hydroelectric dams. A legislative decree by the National Congress in July of 2005 authorizes the construction of the dams, pending the executive branch’s unilateral approval of viability and environmental studies. Both the House and the Senate approve the measure in record time; approval by the Senate comes only 3 days after the measure passed the House. Several NGOs file for a Direct Suit of Unconstitutionality against the legislative decree, which had failed to consult dam-affected populations as required by the law.
On July 13, 2005 Congress issues Decree 788/2005, approving the new plans for the Belo Monte Dam prior to the creation of any environmental impact assessment as well as prior to holding any consultations with affected populations. The Federal Public Prosecutor files a lawsuit, arguing that approval through Decree 788/2005 is illegal.
Eletrobras, Odebrecht, and construction conglomerate Camargo Corrêa publish the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) of the new design, with consultations beginning in 2007 and lasting through 2009. An “Indigenous Component” is also added to the EIA. Four public hearings with tribes are held between 2007-2009, in which Eletrobras describes the impacts that tribes will face and the investments that will be made to mitigate them. Notably, the three tribes on the Volta Grande (the “Big Bend”) stretch of the Xingu River do not give their approval or consent for the project and do not consider the hearings to be “consultations held in good faith.”
The Brazilian National Council for Energy Policy (CNPE) issues Resolution 06/2008, which states that the government will not build any dams further upstream from Belo Monte on the Xingu River. However, the resolution is non-binding, meaning the council is free to reverse this decision at any time.
The second "Xingu Encounter" gathering is held in May of 2008 and is the largest indigenous gathering to ever happen in the Brazilian Amazon. Tribes once again visibly reject the Belo Monte project. Stemming from frustrations with Eletrobras at the encounter, an Eletrobras official is physically confronted by an angry protester, leaving the official wounded. The organizing commission of the Xingu Alive Forever Encounter express their regret over the incident, immediately denouncing the altercation as contrary to the democratic spirit of the debate at the gathering.
In July of 2009, representatives of civil society groups and affected populations meet with President Lula, who personally promises not to “shove Belo Monte down their throats.” The meeting begins with presentations by high-level electric energy sector officials, including Valter Cardeal, Eletrobrás' head of engineering, Altino Ventura Filho, the planning secretary of the Ministry of Mines and Energy, Maurício Tolmasquim, Brazil's head of energy planning, and Paulo Fernando Rezende, the Eletrobrás enginner in charge of studies of Belo Monte. The officials speak poetically on the benefits of Belo Monte ("a gift from God; clean, renewable, cheap energy") and of hydroelectric dams in the Amazon in general. The president is reported as saying: "It's just not possible to build a dam with 11,000 MW [capacity] and then have only 4,000 MW year-round. The energy is going to be very expensive...If the project can be improved, let's build it. If it is inviable, we won't build it". After forty-five minutes, Lula closes the meeting by asking civil society groups to send him a specific critique of the project and orders Eletrobrás to prepare a presentation for him on their plans for Belo Monte.
On February 1st, 2010, The Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (IBAMA) grants Belo Monte a ‘partial’ environmental license, allowing the installation of the construction site without completing the environmental approval of the project as a whole. Partial licenses do not exist in Brazilian legislation. As per the license, the developer must comply with 66 included conditionalities during project implementation.
On April 16, 2010, a regional appellate court overturns a decision by Federal Judge Antonio Carlos de Almeida Campelo to suspend the preliminary license for the dam and cancel the auction, scheduled for Tuesday, April 20th.
In April of 2010, electrical consortium Norte Energia, S.A., with a 75% stake owned by government institutions, wins the project tender.
The Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDES) disburses a first bridge loan to Norte Energia, S.A., for the value of R$1.08 billion.
In January of 2011, a preliminary license is granted, along with 40 ‘mitigation actions’ that will have to be met before an installation license is granted to build the dam. The approval comes after the head of IBAMA is forced to resign due to his previous statement that he would not illegally approve Belo Monte's installation license without Norte Energia first complying with the necessary mitigation actions.
In February of 2011, a new interim president is elected at IBAMA. He immediately grants a “partial” installation license to Norte Energia, S.A. The Federal Public Prosecutor files a lawsuit in response, arguing that “partial” licenses are illegal.
On February 27th, 2011, a federal judge orders the suspension of construction on Belo Monte due to Norte Energia’s failure to comply with the necessary stipulated mitigation actions prior to the approval of the “partial” installation license.
In March 2011, the International Labor Organization (ILO) states that the Brazilian government has violated its commitment to ILO Convention 169 by not holding prior consultations with affected populations.
In early March, a regional judge overturns the ban on Belo Monte construction which had only been instituted just days before. The judge used a legal artifice dating back to the military dictatorship that allows previous legal rulings to be overturned, based on supposed threats to national security.
Following the overturn of the ban on construction, work promptly resumes on creating the project's easement areas.
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, part of the Organization of American States, calls on the Brazil government to suspend Belo Monte due to lack of prior consultations with affected tribes.
The world's second-largest mining corporation, Vale, agrees to purchase a 9% stake in Norte Energia S.A. Additionally, consortiums Engevix and Eletrobras slightly alter the Belo Monte design, removing the Bela Vista weir dam, and reducing the number of water diversion channels from two to one. The design alterations are submitted to IBAMA.
On June 1, 2011 the Brazilian government issues the full installation license allowing the Belo Monte Dam Complex to break ground. Very little is done in the succeeding months to meet the requirements. Only 5 of the 40 requirements are met when an installation license is suddenly granted.
Construction of the cofferdam begins, providing artificial earthen embankments on which to construct the dam.
On October 17, Federal Judge Selene Maria de Almeida votes in a landmark decision in Brazilian courts that the Belo Monte Dam licenses are illegal and must be cancelled due to what is now widely-accepted evidence that the Brazilian government did not hold proper consultations with indigenous tribes that would be affected by the project. De Almeida argues that while the dam reservoirs do not flood indigenous territories, the project's diversion of the Xingu River will directly impact the tribes' abilities to reproduce physically, culturally, and economically, as 80% of the Xingu River would be channeled away from their lands to the reservoirs. De Almeida agrees with the Public Prosecutors, arguing that Article 231 of the Brazilian Constitution requires consultations with indigenous people to be held before congressional approval. In the case of Belo Monte, Congress passed Decreto Legislativo 788 in 2005, a decree that arbitrarily approved Belo Monte before the EIA had even begun. It was only three years later, in 2008, when Eletrobras, Camargo Corrêa, Andrade Gutierrez, and Odebrecht published the EIA. In the court hearing, government lawyers claim that consultations with indigenous people do not have to occur prior to congressional approval, but can be held during the process of environmental licensing.
On October 27, members of indigenous tribes occupy the Belo Monte work site, claiming that Norte Energia has not complied with the project's stipulated conditionalities. An estimated 600 indigenous people from 21 tribes, as well as fishermen from the region, occupy the Belo Monte construction site, demanding a definitive end to the project. The occupation is disbanded when Norte Energia requests a judicial injunction to immediately clear the protest from the work site. Military police arrive shortly thereafter and intimidate the peaceful protestors with the threat of forceful removal if they do not comply with the injunction.
Brazilian mining giant Vale, the leading private shareholder in the Belo Monte Dam, is granted the distinction of being the “Worst Corporation in the World”. After 21 days of public voting, Vale wins the Public Eye Award, known as the "Nobel Prize of Shame" in the corporate world. Vale is a 9% shareholder, making it the largest private company involved in the project. Vale secures the award not only due to its involvement in Brazil's controversial Belo Monte Dam and Carajás mines, but also because of its record of labor and human rights violations in over 38 countries.
Protests on Belo Monte's Pimental work site denounce the "unprecedented crimes" of the Brazilian government against the Amazon and its people. Organized by the Movimento Xingu Vivo para Sempre (Xingu Forever Alive Movement)—a grassroots coalition of social movements, indigenous groups, and NGOs—the protest includes fishermen, farmers, students and other groups from the region that suffer under the impact of the Belo Monte Dam project. The protestors arrive at the dam site by boat, unfurling banners in front of the coffer dams with slogans such as "Belo Monte: crime of the Federal Government", blocking the movement of construction workers and machinery, and paralyzing construction at the site for over two hours.
Norte Energia fails to comply with the agreement that ended the tribal occupation protests. Public prosecutors fine the consortium millions of reais as a result.
The Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) approves a second bridge loan to Norte Energia, S.A., for the value of R$1.8 billion. Caixa Econômica Federal (CEF) passes through R$1.3 billion, and Banco ABC Brasil passes through a further R$500 million.
A meeting of the Xingu+23 is held in Altamira, Brazil, calling for an immediate suspension of Belo Monte. The Xingu+23 is a multi-day series of festivities, debates and actions commemorating 23 years since the residents of the Xingu first defeated the original Belo Monte Dam proposal. Tribes occupy the Belo Monte work site for 20 days, claiming that Norte Energia has not complied with the project's conditionalities. In the early morning hours, 300 residents arrive in the hamlet of Belo Monte on the Transamazon Highway, and march onto a temporary earthen dam recently built to impede the flow of the Xingu River. Using pick axes and shovels, local people who are being displaced by the project remove a strip of earthen dam in an effort to restore the Xingu's natural flow. Residents gather in formation spelling out the words "Pare Belo Monte" (Stop Belo Monte) to send a powerful message to the world prior to the Rio+20 United Nations Earth Summit and to demand the cancellation of the $18 billion Belo Monte Dam project. In addition, hundreds of residents of Altamira hold a march to the headquarters of dam-building consortium Norte Energia.
The Federal Public Prosecutors’ Office files a lawsuit calling for the immediate suspension of the construction license for Belo Monte, which had been granted in June 2011 by the federal environmental agency IBAMA. Citing an abundance of evidence—including reports produced by IBAMA and municipal governments and well-documented complaints filed by local indigenous leaders and NGOs—the lawsuit demands that project construction at Belo Monte be immediately halted, given the chronic non-compliance of Norte Energia with legally-required mitigation and compensation measures.
Three Norte Energia engineers are detained for five days by leaders from the Xikrin, Juruna, and Arara tribes—the three affected tribes living downstream—in the remote village of Muratu after the company fails to live up to promised mitigation measures aimed at reducing the dam’s devastating impacts on local communities. They demand immediate compliance with conditionalities that Norte Energia has ignored. According to tribal leaders, the engineers will remain under detention until Norte Energia and government agencies have fully carried out promises to mitigate and compensate adverse impacts of Belo Monte, not only in relation to boat traffic, but also in terms of water quality, sanitation, and protection of their territories and natural resources. The authorities report that the engineers are prohibited from leaving the village but there is no use of force or violence.
On August 14, Federal Judge Souza Prudente of the Federal Tribunal of Brazil's Amazon region (TRF-1) rules that no consultations were held with indigenous people prior to Congress issuing Decree 788 in 2005, which effectively approved the Belo Monte Dam. Article 231 of the Brazilian Constitution requires direct congressional consultations to be held prior to approval. Thus, the TRF-1 argues that consultations with affected tribes should have happened previous to Congressional approval. In this case, approval was given three years before publication of the environmental impact assessment, and no consultations with indigenous peoples were ever carried out by the Brazilian Congress. As a result, the project's environmental license (granted in 2010) and installation license (granted in 2011) were granted illegally and therefore are now considered invalid, meaning that no further work can continue on the dam.
Norte Energia complies with the written order to stop all work activities. On August 23rd, Norte Energia issues a press statement declaring that they have stopped construction in order to comply with the court order, but that they will be “taking all available measures to reverse the decision.” The halt on construction lasts only 6 days.
On August 27, the Chief Justice of the Brazilian Supreme Court Carlos Ayres Britto unilaterally overturns an August 14 ruling by a regional federal court (TRF-1) to suspend construction of the controversial Belo Monte Dam. Justice Britto’s decision is made in response to a complaint filed by the Attorney General’s office (AGU), in which the central argument is that the regional court’s decision conflicted with a previous Supreme Court ruling in 2007. However, the prior Supreme Court decision actually recognized that the Brazilian Congress’ authorization of Belo Monte—in the absence of prior consultations with indigenous peoples—was flawed. The case illustrates the Brazilian judiciary’s alarming lack of independence when powerful interests are at stake. Work on Belo Monte resumes.
The Federal Public Prosecutors’ Office (Ministério Público Federal - MPF) files an appeal with the Brazilian Supreme Court to stop construction of the Belo Monte Dam until consultations are held with indigenous people affected by the project. Construction was allowed to continue last week due to an injunction issued by Chief Justice Carlos Ayres Britto that suspended an earlier decision of a regional federal court (TRF-1). The appeal requests that Ayres Britto reconsider his decision; if he does not agree, the case will be examined by the plenary of the Supreme Court. The appeal to the Supreme Court is signed by the two highest authorities of the Federal Public Prosecutors' Office, Roberto Gurgel and Deborah Duprat. They maintain that, according to the Brazilian Constitution and Convention 169 of the International Labour Organization (ILO), indigenous people should be consulted by Congress prior to any decision that may affect their survival, as in the case of construction of Belo Monte.
On September 18, the board of Norte Energia approves an extension of the first bridge loan from BNDES (December 2010) to March 12, 2013, as well as an extension of the second bridge loan from BNDES (March 2012, passed through by ABC Brasil and Caixa Econômica Federal) to the same date of March 12, 2013. The board also approves a R$1.02 billion guarantee from BTG Pactual to insure the first bridge loan from BNDES. R$550 million of this guarantee are to be disbursed on October 22nd, 2012, while the remaining R$470 million will be disbursed on November 26, 2012.
On September 19, a group of about 50 fishermen prevent a ferry from transporting machinery and workers to a cofferdam being built, setting up a protest camp on one of the main islands of the Xingu River near the construction site. After assembling, the protesters decide to remain in place indefinitely and call on Norte Energia and IBAMA to immediately negotiate compensation for the loss of ecologically sensitive fish species due to the construction of the cofferdam. As a result of the construction of dams along the Xingu, fishermen have witnessed a 50% reduction in fishery production. According to the movement’s leaders, the occupation protests the IBAMA decision to allow Norte Energia to permanently close the river and that fishermen were not consulted or informed about how they could continue their livelihoods.
On October 8, 120 indigenous leaders from 6 tribes join the fishermen's occupation protest—already standing for 24 days—at the Belo Monte Dam construction site. The renewed occupation of the project's earthen cofferdams slows construction work to a halt. Indigenous protestors seize the keys of trucks and tractors, forcing construction workers to leave the Pimental work camp on foot.
A federal judge orders a conciliatory negotiation between the affected communities and Norte Energia. The conciliatory meetings take place on October 16-18.
On October 18, the almost 30-day long occupation held by an alliance of fishermen and indigenous leaders ends upon the closing of the conciliatory meetings. The majority of the demands of the affected communities are not met, but delayed for future meetings.
On October 31, the Brazilian government orders more than 250 security personnel to take place in military training drills at the Belo Monte construction site, in anticipation of any possible “disruption” from protests.
On November 9, labor unrest breaks out at the two main Belo Monte construction sites, as Consórcio Construtor Belo Monte (CCBM), the construction consortium responsible for building the project, states it will raise wages less than expected in 2013, breaking an agreement with the workers' union. In the unrest, the workers burn down facilities within the worker encampments.
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