Adapted from Jack Devine and Whitney Kassel's article [Afghanistan: Withdrawal Lessons](http://www.worldpolicy.org/journal/fall2013/Afghanistan-withdrawal-lessons) that appeared in [World Policy Journal](http://www.worldpolicy.org/)'s Fall 2013 issue.
The withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghanistan in 2014 is likely to be followed by a civil war between a predominantly non-Pashtun security apparatus and Pakistan-backed Taliban forces. As the U.S. confronts this reality, it would be wise to look closely at the experience of the Soviet Union following its occupation of Afghanistan in the late 1980s.
In the aftermath of its retreat from Afghanistan in 1989, the already crumbling Soviet Union was able to provide funding and military support to prop up President Mohammed Najibullah for three years.
Support comparable to the Soviet Union’s support of President Najibullah will be necessary to sustain the Karzai regime for even one year after the U.S.’s departure, whether that regime is led by Hamid Karzai himself or an American-aligned successor.
Between 1989 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Moscow supplied the Afghans with an estimated $300 million per month, in addition to a vast array of weaponry, MiG-27 fighter jets, and the majority of the military material they had brought into the country as part of their own effort against the Mujahideen. It was only after Soviet support dried up in 1991 that Najibullah’s regime began to unravel, with the Taliban finally sweeping to power in April 1994.
The U.S. is now facing a dangerously similar predicament with President Karzai. Should the federal government prove unwilling to forego the necessary resources to keep him or his allies in Kabul, we will likely see a swift descent into chaos.
President Karzai is widely despised for a range of failings—corruption but also poor governance, vote-rigging, and a continued unwillingness to cooperate fully on key issues such as detainees.
Should the country find itself in the midst of a civil war, creating a more democratic and stable society in a post-withdrawal Afghanistan cannot be accomplished.
It is inevitable that some elements of what is currently considered “the enemy” will have to be drawn into the fold to achieve something resembling order in the country. But as President Barack Obama observed in a 2009 white paper, they must be willing to “lay down their arms, reject Al Qaeda, and accept the Afghan constitution.”
Afghanistan is a land where money goes far. Karzai may be able to negotiate these terms if the international community provides him with the necessary resources.
The military equipment we have and likely will continue to provide will allow the Afghan military to fend off any groups who choose not to negotiate.
The Haqqani network is a key example of a group that has not been quashed by 11 years of extensive military action by U.S., NATO, and Afghan forces. They have, however, proven themselves to be amenable to financial incentives, as the Inter-Services Intelligence has found in its own negotiations with the group.
Just as the world witnessed, in the wake of the Soviet withdrawal, the subsequent rise of the Taliban with Pakistani support, as long as Pakistan continues to fund Afghan insurgents, violence will continue to plague any effort to govern the country.
Pakistan President Nawaz Sharif’s recent overtures toward Afghanistan do present a more hopeful picture than that of the past.
Pakistan has demonstrated through its continued support of insurgent groups operating in Afghanistan a concerted desire to see both continued unrest in Afghanistan and a resurgence of a Pashtun-dominated, Taliban-aligned center of power in Kabul.
Should Pakistan not choose the path of least resistance and turn down U.S. aid in an effort to assert its sovereignty either domestically with regard to counterterrorism, or with respect to our goals in Afghanistan, the U.S. should respond with appropriate covert action.
The role for covert action will be even more essential in the region as military operations in Afghanistan end.
Had the USSR survived after 1991 and employed these methods—providing financial and military support to Kabul, soliciting political support from Pakistan, and maintaining robust covert action and intelligence presence in the region—they may well have prevented the violence and conflict that brought the Taliban to power in 1994.
The new Sharif government presents an opportunity to improve relations with Pakistan and move forward with a political solution in Afghanistan.
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